This past Wednesday I was fortunate to have the opportunity (seriously) to attend an event at the wonderful Brookings Institute, a premier organization of scholars and intellectuals. Their Thornton Center continues to attract some of the best and brightest China-focused minds, whose quality of output might be matched, but hardly surpassed. The event was entitled “Intellectuals Divided: The Growing Political and Ideological Debate in China”, and a more apt title, there are none. Regardless of your level of expertise regarding China, this talk was exceedingly informative and in-depth, while remaining accessible. For individuals interested in what is occurring on the ground in China, the internal governmental and intellectual debates as well as a non-economic assessment and prediction regarding the big red state’s future should hit the jump for more.
The panelists from Wednesday’s event that will be focused on here are three scholars who spend large quantities of time traveling to and from the US and China. This is not to discredit the other two speakers, whom are far more qualified with much greater experience than I, but to provide the freshest possible assessments of the current situation within China. They include: Jianying Zha who heads up the China branch of the India China Institute, as well as teaching at the New School in New York; Cheng Li, the Senior Fellow and Director of Research at the Thornton Center; and Yawei Liu, the director of the Carter Center’s China Program. There was some overlap in the presentations of each of these individuals, but paying a good mind to what was said by the speaker before them, each individual modified their own discourse to generally expand upon and compliment what had just previously been said. Explored, were the prudent questions of ‘How the hell did we get here?’; What is the ongoing conflict really all about?; how is China going to move forward (and who is going to push it there)?; how that is going, and where it will lead.
Cheng Li best started out the progressions rhetorically querying ‘What’s New?’ First however, it is important to understand how we got to this extremely exciting period of social development in China. This process, he asserts (and it is hard to argue against this), began with Mao’s ardent anti-intellectual stance, and demonization of the ‘stinking 9th category’ (臭老九, which was first used in the Yuan Dynasty as a slant against Confucian scholars). In the last thirty years or so, it has become increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to ignore the growing number of intellectuals (defined here as those with a 2 or 4-year college degree), and the numbers reflect this: in 1982 0.4% of the Chinese population possessed such a level of education, while in 2010, 8.9% was the figure. As of 2009, that number was around 38.5% in the United States, though it is interested to note that nearly 50% of Asian-Americans obtained such academic qualification. (It is also important to note that the US has, you know, already industrialized and largely ‘developed’, so don’t let this make you think that for a moment that we’re educating more people since in fact many of those Asians are in fact returning home after obtaining their degree, but more on those sea turtles later). Of course, what this means is that a growing number of individuals are not only educated in academic fields, but also exposed to global desires both of material and ideology. This new class of intellectuals is pitted against a Beijing consensus-based (read: non-democratic) central government (many of whom have been educated abroad, and additionally populated by many intellectuals who successfully hazarded the bridge between someone who writes about government, to one who is actually a part of it). In addition to the new intellectuals and Beijing consensus, there has been a rise of NGOs (who have doubled in numbers over the last 10 years, though still suffer from tight government control), as well as the increasing proliferation of lawyers – and more important than these practitioners perhaps, are the increasingly developed systems of legal framework. Despite their newfound strength in numbers, it is important to note that individuals with these degrees are no longer unified by commonalities in thinking, which has resulted in what is known in the post-Cultural Revolution era as the split of enlightenment intellectuals. This has, according to Liberal scholars Wang Sirui and Zhu Dongli been manifest as those focused as democratization in the 1980s; those focused on nationalism in the 1990s; and finally now those focused on livelihood (the ‘New Left’ so to speak) at the turn of the century. Its important to reiterate that there is no longer a unifying concept for such voices, with some who embrace Mao, others socialist economics, some nationalism, some Neo-Confucianism, and others democracy – the point is that there has been a wide-spanning expansion and diversion of intellectual output and discourse. This incredibly wide range of views is further fragmented by the divisions within fields of thinkers in addition to the fact that there are simply more individuals, from a more diverse array of disciplines intent on contributing to such conversations. As a result, discussions of foreign and domestic policy have become exceedingly intimate and similar, especially as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has become increasingly articulate (as well as prominent) in expressing Chinese national sentiment (or at least, whatever they believe that to be).
Before going on to frame what exactly all of these people are talking about, it is interesting to consider whom the prominent movers and shakers are considered to be, especially when acknowledging that they are being told to you some of those very people by (the presenters, not me). In terms of Liberal intellectuals, it is worth looking into and keeping an eye on: Mao Yushi, Zi Shongyun, He Weifang, Xu Zhiyuan, and to a certain extent, the more extreme He Bing. On the Left (think, the US right) Kong Qidong (ie- someone who admires North Korea…), Chun Ruiyuan who is interested in reintroducing class struggle and seems intent on demonizing the United States; Zhong Weiwei, author of the wildly popular ‘China Shakes’, whose thesis contends that the Western model is not one worth pursuing, given that all who have done so have failed, and well, look at China! And perhaps the most well known outside of China: Danguo Lun, the originator of Chongqing’s take on ‘cake theory’, which we will get into shortly. Additionally, you have the military personnel such as Yang Yi, Luo Yuan, and of great importance Zhu Chenghu, as well as the extremely young, but rapidly rising (and increasingly outspoken) Senior Colonel, Dai Xu. Further speaking to the high levels of disagreement and fragmentation at such high echelon debates is that there was almost no overlap from the presenters with regard to whom the key players to watch were.
What this panel, and what the intellectual and political discourse in China is focused on is in effect, arguing and advocating for the best possible developmental model that China should adopt in its ongoing progression. This can be broken down into broad categories (again, this is a hugely empirical simplification, when in fact the situation is very segmented) as the Guangdong & Chongqing Model versus Beijing Consensus. Or, in English: planning and reform versus incremental steps inherently achieved through following the current (and hypothetically certain) progression of growth. This question of developmental models has a multitude of factors that inform individual opinion and national discourse, but there are some large issues that merit mentioning: China’s Rise, broken down into fall of the US versus fear of collapse; the China Model (CCP isolation vs. universal values and international friends); Mao and the Cultural Revolution (the utopian era versus Mao is Stalin and the Cultural Revolution was worse then Middle Ages); Deng [Xiaoping] and reform (economic disparity, corruption, side effects of globalization pitted against market reform and liberal emancipation). Okay, let’s return to what exactly these models are… The Guangdong / Chongqing Model, which we can encompass as ‘Cake Theory’, is a term coined by the Chinese People’s Congress (CPC) provincial Chief of Guangdong who said:
“Building up the society now has an important place. We need to emphasize on people’s well being. But we need to focus on the economy if we are to make a bigger cake. In other words, our focus is on making a bigger cake, not how to divide the cake.”
This has become a rallying ideology of sorts for the conservative Leftists, and I think an interesting parallel to consider is how conservatives in China seem better poised to rally around a more cohesive idea and recognizable individual while the liberals seem poised to blow it all, but anyway... the Chongqing variation is that while they similarly enjoy delicious patisserie, they are also focusing on how to divide what they’ve already created (though not necessarily rethink how they baked it in the first place). On the other side of the cakes is the Beijing Consensus, a term coined by Joshua Cooper Ramo in 2004 as a comparison to our Washington Consensus. Putting it simply, the question is: continuing with the current course as products shift from being made, to being designed, and eventually imagined in China (or so they advocates believe) versus a complete reworking of the political system with bottom-up direct elections, checks and balances, and an independent judiciary. Should the focus be on issues stemming from economic growth as manifest under the current model? Or should China be reforming the current system to become more democratic so that growth can occur more naturally (vis-à-vis the market) regulated? Recapping briefly, we have the liberals promoting democratic reform, versus ultra-conservative remarks of some party members such as Wu Bangguo’s (the CCP’s number two man after Premier Hu Jintao) famous ‘five no’s’ made largely in response to the ongoing social unrest in the Middle East, in an attempt to downplay their own so-called ‘Jasmine Revolution’, and advocating a continuation of the current model and set of practices: no multi-party elections; no diversified guiding principles; no separation of powers; no federal system; and no privatization. Sounds familiar?
The question now becomes, where does this all mean right now, and in the future? Well, speaker Cheng Li quite successfully captured the sentiment saying that the discourse represents a, “… paradox of hope and fear, promising and dangerous at the same time. “ Which makes sense. Periods of social volatility can usually be categorized as such, and it seems that figures of any base feel that there is need for change that is a promising response to obvious widespread political resentment. Hu Jintao himself has expressed such a necessity (though few doubt he can achieve it even if he really wanted to) saying that China’s current growth is both unstable and unsustainable, and has spoken in favor of protecting the land rights of peasants as a paramount fixture of any future developments, though famously noting the dichotomy in potential developmental models as the two legs of China: the short leg being political change, democracy as a universal value, and the long leg being ongoing economic development. I’ll let you decide which one you think he believes in.
Before exploring the impact of such high intensity disagreement, one must consider one simple question: Is the Cake Important? Well, as Yanwei Liu points out, it is crucial for consensus forming (think Chongqing) and furthermore, that the overwhelming majority of Chinese believe that the political focus should be on how to divide the cake and that the money is already there. And it largely is. A staggering 98% of low-income individuals hold this belief, feeling that economic gains are present, but the lower classes simply are not reaping it. Further complicating the disbursement of massive GDP growth upon the general population are the gaping inefficiencies existing between the central government and local bureaucracies. Beijing simply does not have effective control over local governance, and this combined with an embedded culture of greediness, entitlement, and corruption among local officials makes them overly libel towards doing as little as possible for their constituents. For proponents of applying either of the cake models to other regions in China, I think it prudent to consider how the transplantation of political systems and ideologies has happened on and international scale, and then consider again whether or not that is a good idea, let alone feasible (hint: bad idea, not possible). So then, where does this leave, and lead, China?
Most notably, it reveals the lack of consensus at the upper echelon of Chinese intellectual thought and national political discourse. Speaker Yanwei Liu believes that this is a very dire issue indeed, saying that: “Chinese intellectuals have lost their compass, are too sharply divided, and [are] too close to the leadership…” Noting as I briefly touched upon earlier that such a deep schism amongst reform scholars is only further cemented by the fact that they have no unifying figure (no, Wen Jiabao does not count), and are sliding against the Leftists who have Bo Qilai (the Beida / Peking University educated Chongqing CPC Secretary cake-er), as well as many US educated scholars (those ‘sea turtles’ who have returned home). Zha Jianying, the last and perhaps most captivating speaker, tied it all together nicely when she smugly started off by saying, “Wow. What a fine mess we’re in despite great achievement.”, going on to note that ‘division’ was perhaps the defining characteristic of Chinese society today. She, like many intellectuals, believes that the last few years have been a tremendous step backwards: a rising economy, yet also an increasing frequency of forceful disappearances of individuals (think absentee Nobel Prize winner Liu Xiaobo, or Ai Weiwei, or Gao Zhisheng among countless others), which Zha believes to be representative of ‘ideologically backward’ decision-making from up above. Not only that, but the proliferation of the middle class has resulted in far too few social improvements for those below them, as they remain selfish and focused on serving their own self-interests. That sense of civic responsibility is still just completely fattened by sentiments of filial duties. Despite the shortcomings of the development of Chinese national rhetoric, there are increasing signs of positivity that the presenters very decidedly pointed out. Some scholars in China have labeled this as their Hamilton-Jefferson debate (though I’m not quite convinced, those two founding fathers seemed less subversive and more transparent, though not necessarily any less nasty). Others think that this could be the beginning of partisan politics, which, lets remember, is certainly better than one party rule so far as they don’t devolve into extremism *cough*. Ultimately, Yanwei Liu concludes, and I agree with him wholeheartedly, that it is a good sign that there is such lively debate, but unfortunate that patriotism and division are being used as a vehicle for suppression and mitigation of rising tempers, as opposed to addressing the formative issues themselves.
While we have focused thus far on intellectual, as well as governmental roles and responses to the current discourse, it is of obvious importance to see how citizens have been reacting to the current state of affairs. It is interesting to note that the predominant participants in recent protests are educated urban professionals, mobilizing via the Internet (using Weibo, Facebook, Twitter, etc.), which has been used to fight effective, safer guerilla wars as they can mobilize and disperse rapidly which makes them rather difficult to prevent. Not only that, but they have been attempting to address lifestyle changes, as opposed to focusing on growth, and have been restrained, orderly, and moderate – more shockingly, so too have been the official responses, which often include quick concessions or at least damage control as opposed to a previously more common rebuke in the form of a brutal crackdown. The combination of these circumstances, as Zha Jianying asserts, signifies the growing maturity of both the political elite and intellectuals, who have realized that political disagreement and discussions are not a zero-sum game, but call for pragmatism, moderation, concessions, and debate. Perhaps, as she says, we are witnessing the early stage of a peaceful revolution. Here is to hoping.
Joshua Gottesman
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